UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1995/974
21 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that warships of the United Kingdom on station in the Arabian Gulf are continuing to engage in acts of provocation against Iraqi civilian vessels in Iraqi territorial waters. At 1300 hours on 26 October 1995, a British frigate bearing the number 89 lowered a boat with an officer and three men on board carrying weapons. They drew alongside the Iraqi tug Dimashq, which was at anchor inside Iraqi territorial waters 1.5 nautical miles west of Mina' al-Bakr, and questioned its master for half an hour.

Such acts of provocation confirm the hostile intentions of the Government of the United Kingdom towards Iraq and indicate that the United Kingdom persists in provoking Iraq inside its own territorial waters with a view to creating pretexts for further action against it.

I request you to intervene, as required by the responsibilities entrusted to you under the Charter of the United Nations, in order to prevent any repetition of unwarranted actions that are in flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and security.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-36618 (E) 221195 221195 241195

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Security Council

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S/1995/975
21 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to a number of requests from members of the Security Council. It covers the period since my good offices were formally requested by the Government of Sierra Leone in November 1994.

2. The conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks to overthrow the Government of the All People's Congress (APC) headed by former President Joseph S. Momoh. The conflict has so far caused the deaths of thousands of civilians, while many thousands more are internally displaced or are refugees in Guinea and Liberia.

3. On 29 April 1992, the Government of President Momoh was overthrown by a military coup and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established. Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser became the Chairman of NPRC and Head of State. After the coup, RUF made additional demands and continued its conflict with the new Government.

4. Towards the end of 1993, NPRC regained control of areas held by RUF in the southern and eastern parts of the country and subsequently announced a unilateral cease-fire in December 1993. Nevertheless, attacks on towns, villages and major highways escalated to unprecedented levels and spread throughout the country.

5. In a letter addressed to me on 24 November 1994, Chairman Strasser formally requested my good offices to bring the Government and RUF to negotiations, with the United Nations serving as an intermediary in that process. I dispatched a member of the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Felix Mosha, to Sierra Leone to explore the possibilities of dialogue between the Government and RUF. He held a series of discussions from 15 to 22 December 1994 with Government officials, prominent citizens, religious leaders, resident diplomats and representatives of all United Nations bodies and agencies in Sierra Leone. He was not able, however, to establish contact with RUF in order to assess its

attitude towards negotiations. In a letter to me dated 28 December 1994, Chairman Strasser expressed his appreciation and full support for the mission and requested that I continue my efforts.

6. The findings of the exploratory mission convinced me of the need to establish a more permanent presence in Freetown. I therefore appointed Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) as my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone and communicated this to the President of the Security Council on 7 February 1995 (S/1995/120).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

7. During the last three years, while taking military measures against RUF, the Government has followed a two-track political approach: a negotiated settlement with RUF and democratization of the political process, including transition to an elected civilian Government within a fixed time-frame. These two political approaches are intended to reinforce each other.

A. The pursuit of negotiations

8. Prior to requesting my good offices, the Government had dispatched a delegation of prominent Sierra Leoneans to the border with Liberia to establish contact with RUF and pave the way for peace talks. The delegation met with the representatives of RUF on the Mano river bridge and held meetings with them on 24 November and 4 and 7 December 1994. Since then, there have been no follow-up meetings and each side has blamed the other for the non-resumption of talks. RUF accused the Government of sabotaging the process by issuing derogatory statements while the talks were being held. The Government alleged that the talks were discontinued because RUF took hostage three members of the Government delegation and continues to hold them.

9. My Special Envoy has spared no effort to establish contact with RUF. He has closely collaborated with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth Secretariat and other organizations supporting negotiations in Sierra Leone. Along with the OAU and Commonwealth delegations, he issued a tripartite statement in Freetown in February 1995, calling on RUF to meet with them. He has since kept in constant communication with officials of these two organizations.

10. In his attempts to establish contact with RUF leadership, my Special Envoy has sought and received assistance from official bodies, private individuals and non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone and throughout the subregion. This has enabled him to communicate with Mr. Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF, and some of its senior members. In May 1995, Mr. Sankoh invited my Special Envoy to visit him at his base but later changed his mind. In a similar vein, at the beginning of September 1995, he invited, through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Freetown, a number of prominent Sierra Leoneans to meet him. The Government agreed to allow those invited to proceed to the meeting. On 18 September, ICRC informed RUF of the Government's

agreement and requested RUF to fix the date and venue. No response has yet been received.

11. My Special Envoy is still continuing his efforts through various channels to meet face-to-face with the RUF leader. In addition to these efforts, he has been assisting and encouraging the Government in its democratization process.

B. Democratization

12. On 26 November 1993, Chairman Strasser issued a declaration setting out a programme of transition to democratic constitutional rule. According to the schedule, registration of voters was to have been completed from March to June 1994 and presidential elections were to have taken place in November 1995. However, the continued conflict and limited State resources have delayed the implementation of the transition programme by one year.

13. On 27 April 1995, on the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of independence, Chairman Strasser reaffirmed the commitment of NPRC to the transition programme, pledging that everything possible would be done to complete its implementation by January 1996, when a democratically elected President would be sworn in. Several important steps have followed that pronouncement.

14. The Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC), which was established by Decree No. 1, 1994, has intensified its activity under the chairmanship of Mr. James O. C. Jonah. Its sister organization, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), established by Decree No. 15, 1994, promotes civic and voter education throughout the country.

15. At the request of the Government, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division conducted a needs assessment mission from 22 November to 2 December 1994, in close collaboration with the National Electoral Commission, to identify the technical requirements for organizing the electoral process, including voter registration, polling, civic education, training of electoral officers, legal issues and the electoral timetable.

16. On 20 June 1995, the Government issued Decree No. 7, 1995, lifting the ban on political activities, which it had imposed when it came to power, and empowered INEC to register political parties. Fifteen political parties have so far been issued with final certificates of registration and have begun campaigning (see annex I).

17. In order to build broad-based support for the electoral process, a National Consultative Conference on Elections was held in Freetown from 15 to 17 August 1995 with the participation of all the political parties, representatives of the Government and 78 different organizations representing a wide spectrum of civil society. The Conference adopted a system of elections based on proportional representation, a code of conduct for political parties and rules to govern campaign financing. The Conference overwhelmingly agreed to hold elections by the end of February 1996. The date has since been set for

26 February 1996. The vigorous debate and the consensus that emerged indicate wide support for the democratic process.

18. As a result of these decisions, INEC is ready to begin voter registration and to finalize preparations for the elections. However, there are serious financial constraints that endanger this process: the total budgetary requirement is US$ 10,730,219, but only US$ 1,125,005 in cash and kind has so far been raised from external sources (see annex II). Unless additional financial support is made available, the electoral timetable will not be met.

19. Postponement of the elections could result in escalating violence and halt altogether the process of democratization. There are some elements within Sierra Leone that seek to derail the electoral process, as was attested by the attempted coup of 2 October 1995.

20. Various efforts have been made to raise resources. At a briefing of donor countries on the electoral and political situation in Sierra Leone on 2 November 1995, the response was very positive. I am convening a donors' conference on electoral assistance to Sierra Leone in New York on 30 November and I urge Member States to respond generously.

21. I have instructed my Special Envoy to follow closely all aspects of the democratization process. I have also instructed him to encourage the Government and leaders of the political parties to safeguard the integrity of the process, ensuring that the elections are free and fair and that their outcome is not contested.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

22. When NPRC took power, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces numbered 3,000. A massive recruitment drive increased their total strength to around 14,000. After the December 1994 offensive by RUF, however, it became clear that the forces were inadequate to confront the challenges they faced. In addition, some soldiers have been implicated in illegal activities.

23. Given the links between the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, certain regional and other countries have taken the decision to provide military assistance to Sierra Leone. In addition, NPRC has been using non-Sierra Leonean advisers to improve the fighting skills of its troops, instil discipline and upgrade command and control.

24. The situation on the ground has not changed dramatically. Foreign and Sierra Leonean nationals, including seven nuns, were taken hostage in different parts of the country in early 1995 and subsequently released on 21 March 1995. In addition, RUF began moving closer to Freetown and captured several villages in Kono District, an area rich in diamonds and therefore of great economic importance.

25. Recently, morale and discipline within the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces appear to have improved. The diamond fields of Kono and a number of villages were retaken by Government forces in July and August 1995.

The frequency of ambushes on the highways has decreased in the last few weeks and, if the present trend continues, the delivery of relief assistance to the countryside, as well as registration and voting, will be facilitated.

26. The majority of the combatants on both sides are young men with no employable skills other than soldiering. The Government has expressed its desire to demobilize part of its army. This is imperative, but it is also vital to reintegrate the demobilized soldiers into society as productive citizens. Sierra Leone lacks the resources to accomplish this task and the international community needs to assist the processes of demobilization and reintegration. While this programme will initially cover only members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces and those RUF combatants who are already in the hands of the Government, it must be designed to cover those still in the field as soon as a cease-fire and peace agreement are in place.

27. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces held a seminar on 16 and 17 November 1995 with civilians and representatives of political parties to discuss the differences of perception and mutual suspicion between the military and the civilian population. It hopes that this seminar will create a harmonious environment in preparation for the forthcoming transition to civilian rule.

IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The socio-economic costs of the war

28. Much of the fighting has taken place in the mineral-rich areas in the south and east and the agriculturally viable regions where cocoa, coffee and other cash crops are grown. As a result, production of gold and diamonds dropped from 43,000 tons in 1991 to 38,000 tons in 1994. This was reflected in a $30 million decline in exports. Income from the production of cash crops has declined from $21 million in 1990 to $7.6 million in 1993, a fall of 64 per cent. At the same time, government expenditures have risen as a result of the war; it is estimated that some 75 per cent of total revenue is now spent on the war effort.

29. Infrastructure damage has been enormous, with academic institutions, government offices, banks, health centres, schools and hospitals in a state of severe disrepair. Roads, bridges and construction equipment have been destroyed, while the Government, the churches, NGOs and mining companies have closed or scaled down operations and laid off thousands of workers as part of the austerity measures.

30. The Government has been credited with stabilizing the economy. However, the formal economy accounts for only 25 to 30 per cent of the country's total economic activities. As economic opportunities in the formal sector decline, people have little choice but to participate more fully in the informal economy, including resorting to acts of banditry.

31. Much of the war is being fought in the rural areas, particularly in the south and east, affecting semi-subsistence farmers who make up the bulk of the rural population. Farms have been destroyed, food stores burnt, domestic

animals stolen or killed and agricultural tools looted. Attacks have consistently taken place during the dry season, preventing farmers from harvesting their crops. As a result, 248,800 tons of cereals were imported in 1992, an 80 per cent increase over the previous year. Continued food shortages are likely to perpetuate the war.

V. HUMANITARIAN

32. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone remains critical. Nearly 2 million people have been internally displaced, the majority flocking to major towns, including Bo, Kenema and Makeni. This represents close to 50 per cent of the country's estimated population of 4,477,000. Only about 1.1 million persons from this group receive assistance with any degree of regularity, owing to security constraints. Highways linking Freetown to key population centres have been usable only sporadically for much of this year and the impact on civilian populations has been severe. In the eastern and south-eastern areas of the country, which have been totally inaccessible for more than eight months, it is feared that malnutrition will soon reach life-threatening levels. Beginning in September 1995, however, there has been a relative improvement in access, allowing humanitarian organizations to deliver relief without armed escorts. Areas in the eastern portion of the country, however, remain inaccessible.

33. The gap between the resources made available by the international community for humanitarian assistance and the unmet needs of the affected population continues to be great. In March 1995, I launched the United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal for humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, covering the period from March to December 1995 and requesting $14.7 million for the emergency activities of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Only 41 per cent of the funds requested has been received. This pattern is particularly worrying with respect to the status of WFP food stocks and anticipated needs for the coming year. Resources are required as soon as possible to prevent an even more precarious food aid situation next year.

34. The emergency situation has prevented development organizations from carrying out any sustained activity outside the Freetown area. Programmes have now been reoriented to address the emergency. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs will establish a humanitarian assistance coordination unit in Freetown, staffed by three experienced officers, to support the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

35. While the situation in Sierra Leone is generally characterized by conflict, human suffering and economic decline, there are some positive emerging trends which, if assisted, would contribute to the re-establishment of peace and stability. The ongoing process of democratization, particularly the elections set for 26 February 1996, is a significant element in this development and worthy of the international community's support.

36. The internal conflict that has raged for the last four years has damaged or destroyed much of the vital physical and social infrastructure of the country. In order to consolidate the democratic process and support the incoming elected civilian Government, I urge the international community to demonstrate its solidarity with the people of Sierra Leone, many of whom believe that the world has abandoned them. Some initial steps must be taken now to signal the international community's commitment to assist this democratization process.

37. Given the importance of the issue, I am instructing the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to field a team of experts to prepare, in collaboration with the Government, a coordinated and workable action plan for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. The team will take into account the experiences gained by the United Nations in El Salvador and Mozambique, as well as the present effort in Liberia, to identify sources of funds so that implementation can begin expeditiously.

38. I have also instructed the Electoral Assistance Division to work closely with other United Nations agencies and programmes, in particular UNDP, to assist INEC in coordinating international observers during the elections and in strengthening national observer groups.

39. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is a cause for concern because of the widening gap between the needs of the war-affected population and the resources available to humanitarian agencies. Unless the international community responds quickly to enhance the humanitarian agencies' capacity to deliver relief assistance in time and in sufficient quantity, the situation may become desperate. In this connection, I should like to commend all United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations operating in Sierra Leone for their response to the emergency situation by reorienting their various programmes.

40. Delivering relief assistance to the needy is not an easy task even at the best of times. It becomes almost impossible when humanitarian convoys are targeted. Members of the Security Council may consider admonishing those responsible for attacking relief convoys and urging them to refrain from such deplorable actions.

41. Despite all efforts to contact it, the RUF leadership has remained elusive and unresponsive to initiatives for a meeting or negotiations. While commending those Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals that have been supporting the efforts of my Special Envoy, the time has come for the international community to urge RUF to take advantage of my good offices and to initiate a process of negotiation.

42. I intend to retain my Special Envoy in Sierra Leone for the time being. He will continue his efforts to establish a dialogue between RUF and the Government and to support the process of democratization. His efforts will be coordinated with OAU and the Commonwealth.

43. In conclusion, I should like to call upon Member States to provide the fullest possible material and financial support to INEC so that the elections

can be held on schedule. Although there are legitimate security concerns, experience has shown in other places, such as Cambodia and South Africa, that the democratic process should not be held hostage to the intransigence of any particular group.

Annex I

List of registered political parties in Sierra Leone

	Name of political party	Name of leader
1.	People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Edward Bundu-Kamara
2.	National Unity Movement (NUM)	Desmond Luke
3.	People's National Convention (PNC)	Ibrahim Ben Kargbo
4.	United National People's Party (UNPP)	John Karafa-Smart
5.	People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Thaimu Bangura
6.	All People's Congress (APC)	S. A. T. Koroma
7.	National Unity Party (NUP)	A. O. D. George
8.	Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	Rev. Paul Dumbar
9.	National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	Foday B. Mansaray
10.	National People's Party (NPP)	Alimamy Yamba Komeh
11.	National Republican Party (NRP)	Sahr Steven Mambu
12.	Democratic Centre Party (DCP)	Abu A. Koroma
13.	Coalition for Progress Party (CPP)	Ms. Jeredine Williams Sarho
14.	National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)	Mohamed Y. Sillah
15.	Social Democratic Party (SDP)	Andrew Lungay

Annex II

Interim National Electoral Commission

Electoral assistance budget (November 1995-March 1996)

Funding status as at 24 October 1995

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Coordination	Chief technical adviser	108 000	108 000 a/		
	Legal adviser	60 000	60 000 b/		
	United Nations Volunteers	55 000			55 000
	Electoral coordinator	30 000			30 000
	Admin. support personnel	36 000	36 000 a/		
	Mission costs/duty travel	25 000	25 000 a/		
	Reports sundries	18 000	18 000 a/		
	Subtotal	332 000	247 000		85 000
Voter education	International personnel				
	Media coordinator	60 000	60 000 b/		
	Civic education consultant	120 000	120 000 c/		
	National personnel				
	Civic education consultants	12 000	10 000 a/		2 000
	Publicity supervisors	14 667			14 667
	Publicity officers	175 000			175 000
	Publicity assistants	400 000			400 000
Materials rental	Audiovisual productions	55 556	20 000 d/		35 556
	Theatre productions	100 000	63 000 e/		37 000
	Design/graphic materials	83 333			83 333
	Vehicle rental	100 000			100 000

/...

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Launch/other rental	5 556			5 556
	Mobile radio communications	300 000	50 000 a/		250 000
	Training	50 556			50 556
	Equipment materials	100 687			100 687
	Audiovisual communication vehicles	250 000	250 000 f/		
	Fuel and maintenance	106 500			106 500
	Subtotal	1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
Voter registration	International personnel				
	Logistics coordinator	60 000	60 000 g/		
	Team leaders	40 000			40 000
	Database expert	17 555	17 555 a/		
	Registration coordinators	7 200	7 200 a/		
	Registrars	500 000			500 000
	Data editors	25 667			25 667
	Revision personnel	250 000			250 000
	Data entry personnel	20 000			20 000
	Logistics assistants	6 000			6 000
Training	Registration officials	100 000		63 000 h/	37 000
Rentals/others	Vehicles for registration	166 667			166 667
	Vehicles for revision	83 333			83 333
Materials	Registration	400 000		100 000 h/ 100 000 i/	300 000
	Computerization	220 250	8 500 e/ 211 750 h/		
	Subtotal	1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Polling	International and national personnel				
	Nomination day	20 767			20 767
	Election day	900 638			900 638
	INEC supervisory personnel	100 000			100 000
	Trainees, monitors	533 333			533 333
	Training coordinator	7 200			7 200
	Training assistants	10 800			10 800
Training	Election officers training	250 000			250 000
Materials/rentals	Materials rentals	85 000			85 000
	Vehicle rentals	233 333			233 333
	Election day materials	851 067		c/	851 067
	Food/materials for brigades	109 667			109 667
	United Nations Secretariat equipment	69 220			69 220
	Helicopter lease	1 000 000			1 000 000
	Subtotal	4 171 025			4 171 025
Transportation	Purchases				
	Field vehicles (6)	240 000			240 000
	Light vehicles (14)	560 000			560 000
	Trucks (5)	266 667			266 667
	Minibuses (5)	400 000			400 000
	Motor bicycles/bicycles	150 000			150 000

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Operation/maintenance	500 000			500 000
	Air transport fuel/operations	300 000			300 000
	Subtotal	2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214
Summary					
Coordination		332 000	247 000		85 000
Voter education		1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
Voter registration		1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667
Polling		4 171 025			4 171 025
Transportation		2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214

a/ United Nations Development Programme.

b/ Commonwealth.

c/ European Union.

d/ Greece.

e/ United States of America.

f/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

g/ Canada.

h/ Sierra Leone.

i/ Sweden.

Annex III

Resource mobilization for the Sierra Leone emergency

Agency	Requirements	Pledges	Shortfall	Percentage of needs covered
United Nations Children's Fund	2 799 000	1 100 000	1 699 000	39.3
World Health Organization	1 325 000	759 856	565 144	57.3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4 648 800	336 538	4 312 262	7.2
Department of Humanitarian Affairs	237 500	8 772	228 728	3.7
World Food Programme (non-food)	450 000	0	450 000	0
(food and ITSH) a/				
Vegetable oil	3 503 640	1 455 000	2 048 640	41.5
Corn-soya blend	686 280	592 800	93 480	86.4
ITSH a/	493 038	278 460	214 578	56.5
Subtotal	4 682 958	2 326 260	2 356 698	49.7
Total for consolidated appeal	14 143 258	4 531 426	9 611 832	32.0
United Nations Development Programme b/		4 104 000		
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations b/		356 000		
United Nations Population Fund b/		100 000		
Grand total	14 143 258	9 091 426	9 611 832	

a/ Internal transport, stores and handling.

b/ Not included in the March-December consolidated appeal.

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21 November 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 21 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia and of the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force.

From 30 October to 3 November 1995, a number of F-16 fighter aircraft of the Turkish Air Force flew repeatedly in the Nicosia FIR without any prior notification or permission from the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, violating international air traffic rules and endangering civil aviation flights over Cyprus.

The violations of the Nicosia FIR on 30 October 1995 were as follows:

1. Five formations of F-16 fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR from 0900 to 1130 hours. During these flights, the F-16s were refuelled by another aircraft.

2. From 1110 to 1120 hours, another formation of two F-16s flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 11,800 to 22,700 feet and at a speed of 442 to 495 knots.

3. From 1120 to 1124 hours, a formation of two F-16s flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 17,500 to 22,500 feet and at a speed of 440 to 495 knots.

The following day, 31 October 1995, the violations of the Nicosia FIR by Turkish Air Force fighter aircraft continued as follows:

1. From 1055 to 1059 hours, a formation of two F-16 fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR, flying at an altitude of 15,700 feet and at a speed of 405 knots.

2. From 1115 to 1120, a second formation of two F-16 fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 15,700 feet and at a speed of 485 knots.

On 3 November 1995, the violations of the Nicosia FIR by Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter aircraft continued as follows:

1. From 1053 to 1107 hours, a formation of two Turkish Air Force fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 20,000 feet and at a speed of 400 to 500 knots.

2. From 1108 to 1115 hours, a second formation of two Turkish fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 17,000 to 25,000 feet and at a speed of 439 to 512 knots.

3. From 1113 to 1118 hours, a third formation of two Turkish fighter aircraft flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 22,000 feet and at a speed of 480 knots.

4. From 1020 to 1130 hours, three formations of Turkish Air Force fighter aircraft and a tanker flew in the Nicosia FIR at an altitude of 11,000 to 24,000 feet and at a speed of 405 to 513 knots.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish strongly to protest against these violations of the Nicosia FIR and of the Republic's airspace by Turkish Air Force aircraft. These violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicos AGATHOCLEOUS
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Cyprus
to the United Nations

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NATIONS

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22 November 1995
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AND SPANISH

Argentina, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Oman, Rwanda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and in particular its resolutions 713 (1991) and 727 (1992),

Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement) by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto on 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, signifying agreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace Agreement,

Welcoming also the commitments of the parties set out in Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) of the Peace Agreement,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1991) shall be terminated as follows, beginning from the day the Secretary-General submits to the Council a report stating that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have formally signed the Peace Agreement:

(a) during the first ninety days following the submission of such a report, all the provisions of the embargo shall remain in place;

(b) during the second ninety days following the submission of such a report, all provisions of the arms embargo shall be terminated, except that the delivery of heavy weapons (as defined in the Peace Agreement), ammunition therefor, mines, military aircraft and helicopters shall continue to be prohibited until the arms control agreement referred to in Annex 1B has taken effect; and

(c) after the 180th day following the submission of such a report and after the submission of a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) as agreed by the parties, all provisions of the arms embargo terminate unless the Council decides otherwise;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare in a timely way and to submit to the Council the reports referred to in paragraph 1 above;

3. Maintains its commitment to progressive measures for regional stability and arms control and, if the situation requires, to consider further action;

4. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to review and to amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of this resolution;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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22 November 1995
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Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,

Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Commending the efforts of the international community, including those of the Contact Group, to assist the parties in reaching a settlement,

Praising the decision of the Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to attend and participate constructively in proximity talks in the United States of America, and acknowledging with appreciation the efforts made by these Governments to reach a lasting peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement) by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto on 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, signifying agreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace Agreement,

Noting the Concluding Statement issued at the adjournment of the proximity talks, in which all parties undertook, inter alia, to assist in locating the two French pilots missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to ensure their immediate and safe return,

Stressing the need for all parties to comply fully with all provisions of the Peace Agreement,

Noting that compliance with the requests and orders of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia constitutes an essential aspect of implementing the Peace Agreement,

Recognizing the interests of all States in the implementation of the suspension and subsequent termination of measures imposed by the Council, and in particular the interests of the successor States to the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with respect to the disposition of assets affected by the fact that that State has ceased to exist, and the desirability of accelerating the process now under way under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to reach a consensual agreement among the successor States as to the disposition of such assets,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that the measures imposed by or reaffirmed in resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992), 820 (1993), 942 (1994), 943 (1994), 988 (1995), 992 (1995), 1003 (1995) and 1015 (1995) are suspended indefinitely with immediate effect subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 5 below, and provided that if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has failed formally to sign the Peace Agreement on the date announced by the Contact Group for such purpose, and that the other parties thereto have expressed their readiness so to sign, the measures described above shall be automatically reimposed from the fifth day following the date of such report;

2. Decides also that the suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to the measures imposed on the Bosnian Serb party until the day after the commander of the international force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace Agreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the appropriate political authorities, informs the Council via the Secretary-General that all Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn behind the zones of separation established in the Peace Agreement; and urges all parties concerned to take all necessary measures to assist in locating the two French pilots mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to ensure their immediate and safe return;

3. Further decides that if at any time, with regard to a matter within the scope of their respective mandates and after joint consultation if appropriate, either the High Representative described in the Peace Agreement, or the commander of the international force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace Agreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the appropriate political authorities, informs the Council via the Secretary-General that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serb authorities are failing significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement, the suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth day following the Council's receipt of such a report, unless the Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the non-compliance;

4. Further decides that it will terminate the measures described in paragraph 1 above on the tenth day following the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in annex 3 of the Peace Agreement, provided that the Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn from, and have continued to respect, the zones of separation as provided in the Peace Agreement;

5. Further decides that so long as the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above remain suspended, or are terminated by a subsequent Council decision in accordance with paragraph 4 above, all funds and assets previously frozen or impounded pursuant to resolutions 757 (1992) and 820 (1993) may be released by States in accordance with law, provided that any such funds and assets that are subject to any claims, liens, judgements, or encumbrances, or which are the funds or assets of any person, partnership, corporation, or other entity found or deemed insolvent under law or the accounting principles prevailing in such State, shall remain frozen or impounded until released in accordance with applicable law, and decides further that obligations of States related to freezing or impounding funds and assets contained in such resolutions shall be suspended pursuant to paragraph 1 above with respect to all funds and assets not currently frozen or impounded until the measures concerned are terminated by a subsequent Council decision;

6. Further decides that the suspension or termination of obligations pursuant to this resolution is without prejudice to claims of successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with respect to funds and assets; stresses the need for the successor States to reach agreement on the distribution of funds and assets and the allocation of liabilities of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; encourages all States to make provision under their national law for addressing competing claims of States, as well as claims of private parties affecting funds and assets; and further encourages States to take appropriate measures to facilitate the expeditious collection of any funds and assets by the appropriate parties and the resolution of claims related thereto;

7. Further decides that all States shall continue to take the necessary measures to ensure that there shall be no claim in connection with the performance of any contract or other transaction where such performance was affected by the measures imposed by the resolutions referred to in paragraph 1 above and related resolutions;

8. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to review and to amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of this resolution;

9. Pays tribute to the neighbouring States, the ICFY mission, the European Union/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Sanctions Coordinator, the Sanctions Communications Centre and the Sanctions Assistance Missions, the Western European Union operation on the Danube and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Western European Union Sharp Guard operation in the Adriatic Sea for their significant contribution to the achievement of a negotiated peace;

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/979
22 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,

Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and emphasizing in this regard that the territories of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, known as Sector East, are integral parts of the Republic of Croatia,

Affirming the importance it attaches to full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all in those territories,

Commending the continuing efforts of the representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,

1. Welcomes the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (S/1995/951, annex), signed on 12 November 1995 between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb representatives in the presence of the United Nations mediator and the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia;

2. Recognizes the request to it contained in the Basic Agreement to establish a Transitional Administration and authorize an appropriate international force, stands ready to consider the above request expeditiously in order to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, and invites the

Secretary-General to maintain the closest possible contact with all those concerned in order to assist with its work on the matter;

3. Stresses the need for the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb party to cooperate fully on the basis of the Agreement and refrain from any military activity or any measure that might hinder the implementation of the transitional arrangements set out in it, and reminds them of their obligation to cooperate fully with UNCRO and to ensure its safety and freedom of movement;

4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/780
S/1995/980
22 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 118
JOINT INSPECTION UNIT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 21 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Sharing responsibilities in peace-keeping: the United Nations and regional organizations" (JIU/REP/95/4), transmitted to the members of the General Assembly in a note by the Secretary-General under agenda item 118 (A/50/571).

On previous occasions the delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic has drawn to the attention of the United Nations authorities that in a number of documents issued by the United Nations and dealing with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan the name "Nagorny Karabakh" was used without any indication of the fact that the region belongs to the Azerbaijan Republic (see, for example, S/25635).

Unfortunately, the same mistake has been repeated in the aforementioned report. In particular, paragraphs 30, 38 and 48 and annex I./3 to the report ignore the fact that Nagorny Karabakh is an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic, whereas further in the text in a similar context Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been identified as parts of the Republic of Georgia.

It is rather perplexing that the authors of the report, while abundantly citing various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, have totally neglected relevant resolutions of the Security Council, namely resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), General Assembly resolution 49/13 entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", as well as the recent report of the Secretary-General entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (A/50/564). All these documents unequivocally reaffirm the status of Nagorny Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan.

In the light of the foregoing, the delegation of the Azerbaijan Republic deems it necessary to express its strongest protest and demands that the authors of the report immediately correct this flagrant political mistake. Otherwise this shall constitute a serious infringement upon the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic on the part of the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under the agenda item 118, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eldar KOULIEV
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/781
S/1995/981
22 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 22 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 22 November 1995, addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 22 November 1995 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 31 October 1995 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot Representative at the United Nations (A/50/715-S/1995/918) concerning alleged developments affecting the 1989 Unmanning Agreement.

In connection with the allegations of "new information" relating to constructions on the Yiğitler (Roccas) Bastion in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, I wish to stress that these allegations are totally baseless and to recall that similar previous allegations on this subject have been conclusively refuted in your letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 25 July 1995, in which it is stated that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) "is of the view that construction on Roccas Bastion to date, including the material used, does not indicate work carried out to normal military specifications, or to any evident military logic". Furthermore, as you are well aware, UNFICYP has had unhindered periodic access to the site and, in addition to monitoring the area on a round-the-clock basis from an observation post overlooking the area, UNFICYP has been allowed to conduct on-site inspections twice a week. No complaints have been received from UNFICYP during or after these inspections, and it appears that the persistence of the Greek Cypriot allegations on this matter, in spite of the above, is the result of their refusal to accept that the matter is closed, lest they be deprived of a means of generating political propaganda.

The construction on the Yiğitler (Roccas) Bastion has recently been completed and the children's park, together with its cafeteria, were inaugurated in a public ceremony on 15 November 1995, as part of the twelfth anniversary celebrations of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side's continuing recriminations on this subject are designed to provide a smokescreen for the recent intensification of its own violations of the 1989 Unmanning Agreement on the above occasion. As is known, for three days running, from 7 to 9 November 1995, hundreds of Greek Cypriot students staged violent demonstrations along the borders, violating the buffer zone, including at this very location.

On 7 November, after having blocked all traffic at the Ledra Palace crossing point between the two sides in Nicosia, including the passage of UNFICYP personnel, several hundred demonstrators carried their provocations to the point of physically assaulting Turkish Cypriot workers by hurling stones at them at the children's park on the Yiğitler Bastion. As a result, several workers were injured and windows of the park's cafeteria were broken. One UNFICYP soldier was hurt, and the ambulance that came to pick him up was stoned.

On 8 November, the demonstrations became more violent with the participation of around 1,000 students, who assembled at the Ledra Palace checkpoint as of 9.30 a.m., blocking the gate to all traffic. They were led by

their teachers, indicating that the schools had been closed by an official decision of the Greek Cypriot administration just for this purpose.

One group of demonstrators advanced to the Yiğitler Bastion, from where they threw stones, shouted insults and engaged in obscene behaviour against the Turkish Cypriot side. More windows of the cafeteria of the children's park were broken as a result of stone throwing. It is significant that the students were carrying Greek flags and shouting slogans in favour of ENOSIS (annexation of Cyprus to Greece).

Another group of demonstrators proceeded to the "Okullar Bölgesi" area in Nicosia, where they physically attacked and punched UNFICYP personnel who were trying to prevent them from violating the buffer zone. Several UNFICYP soldiers were injured. Penetrating the buffer zone, they came within 20 to 30 metres of the border of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Here they occupied an UNFICYP observation post, on which they raised the Greek flag. With the stones they threw at the Turkish Cypriot side from here, they broke the windows of many houses close to the border. A group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists also took part in this demonstration.

The demonstrations continued the next day, on 9 November, on an even larger scale, involving 1,500 students, who concentrated their provocative activities at Okullar Bölgesi. Here, once again, the students violated the buffer zone, causing injury to UNFICYP personnel, and burned a Turkish flag they had brought with them.

Such manifestations of anti-Turkish hysteria, aggressive behaviour and repeated violations of the United Nations-controlled buffer zone as well as the Unmanning Agreement of 1989 only serve to heighten tension on the island, at a time when the atmosphere is already burdened with the Greek Cypriot side's continuing campaign of militarization and inflammatory rhetoric. I wish to stress, once more, that incitement of Greek Cypriot youth to such militant and irresponsible behaviour, far from serving the cause of peace and reconciliation on the island, is driving a further wedge between the two communities, whose repercussions are bound to be felt for generations to come.

I would be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/982
24 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to a disturbing situation where the airplanes of the Allied Forces operating in Iraq repeatedly violate the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the west, south-west and south, and the Persian Gulf. A list of 15 such violations in June and July of 1995 and their particulars is herewith annexed.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon Your Excellency to take appropriate measures to stop such practices.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-37094 (E) 241195 251195

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Annex

	TIME	DATE	NO. OF AIRPLANE	SPEED (NAUTICAL MILES)	ALTITUDE (FEET)	DIRECTION
1	0957	29/6/95	1	240	12 000 feet	North of 3000N and 4845E
2	1635	29/6/95	1	360	17 000 feet	South of 3100N and 4800E
3	0840	29/6/95	2	420	26 000 feet	East of 3045N and 4755E
4	0908	29/6/95	2	450	27 000 feet	East of 3125N and 4745E
5	1447	4/7/95	1	300	10 000 feet	NE of 2840N and 5025E
6	1210	5/7/95	1	300	18 000 feet	NE of 2835N and 5045E
7	1225 1235	6/7/95	2	420	25 000 feet 28 000 feet	3030N and 4720E 3115N and 4725E
8	1837	7/7/95	6	420	30 000 feet	North of 3030N and 4730E
9	0850	7/7/95	1	420	25 000 feet	South of 3925N and 4450E
10	2000	7/7/95	2	420	26 000 feet	2935N and 4850E
11	1245	8/7/95	1	240	15 000 feet	SE of 2840N and 5025E
12	1150	9/7/95	1	300	8 000 feet	SE of 2900N and 5025E
13	1423	10/7/95	2	450	27 000 feet	North of 3040N and 4740E
14	1020	10/7/95	2	420	25 000 feet	3100N and 4710E
15	0735	18/7/95	6	360	19 000 feet	East of 3035N and 4745E

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/783
S/1995/983
24 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda items 70 (j), 71 (b) and 81
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: REGIONAL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 20 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the declaration on confidence-building measures between Ecuador and Peru signed on 8 November 1995 by the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru at the Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region (Latin America), held in Santiago, Chile, on the same date.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 70 (j), 71 (b) and 81, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Luis VALENCIA RODRIGUEZ
Permanent Representative

Annex

Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in the Region

Declaration on confidence-building measures between Ecuador and Peru adopted in Santiago on 8 November 1995

It is a great honour for the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and Peru to announce jointly to this Regional Conference a number of shared principles that have led to the identification and successful implementation of mutual confidence-building measures, adopted by the two countries as part of the process of détente and normalization of their bilateral relations.

The Itamaraty Declaration of Peace between Ecuador and Peru was signed on 17 February 1995 with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States of America in their capacity as Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942. In that Declaration, in addition to confirming the cessation of hostilities, Ecuador and Peru, seeking to consolidate the cease-fire and to prevent further confrontations, agreed to separate the forces involved in the confrontations and to initiate immediately, as a confidence-building measure, a gradual and reciprocal demobilization in the border zones not affected by the clashes. It was also agreed to send an Observer Mission of the Guarantor Countries to supervise these measures and to request the Mission to recommend an area to be totally demilitarized.

Furthermore, the Itamaraty Declaration of Peace provides for the initiation of talks, as soon as the above-mentioned agreements have been fulfilled and a climate of détente and friendship has been restored, with a view to finding a solution to the remaining impasses between the two countries.

The timely and important action has taken greatly assisted in creating a climate conducive to continued negotiation through dialogue and understanding, leading to the elimination of border incidents and ensuring a prompt and satisfactory resolution of the unfortunate events of early 1995.

The presence of the President of the Republic of Peru in Quito at the ninth summit of the Rio Group, held on 4 and 5 September 1995; the reopening of the frontier for trade between the two countries; the restoration of the mechanism for bilateral diplomatic consultations at the level of Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14 December in Quito with a view to attendance at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty; the announced visit to Lima in January 1996 of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ecuador in response to an invitation by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru; and the presence in Lima of the President of Ecuador for the meeting of the Andean Presidential Council to be held in March 1996, are practical examples of the importance that both countries attach to mutual trust as a basis for progress in their bilateral relations.

The agreement on the gradual incorporation of officers from Ecuador and Peru in the Military Observer Mission and the adoption on 26 October 1995 of the "security booklets", which are already in force between the two countries, are specific confidence-building measures designed to prevent incidents and to promote closer ties of friendship between their respective armed forces and police forces.

Among the measures contained in the above-mentioned booklets, observance of which is mandatory for the army, navy, air force and police force of each country, mention may be made of: the undertaking to refrain from using firearms - even to fire shots into the air - when two ground patrols meet or when an aircraft of the armed forces or the police flies beyond its airspace; the development of mutual support activities in the event of epidemics, disasters or accidents; the organization of sports visits and activities and exchanges of greetings on national holidays; the suspension of ground, naval and air patrols in all areas where incidents have occurred; provision of emergency facilities for vessels and aircraft; exchanges of detailed advance information on field exercises and/or shooting practice and on overflights for reconnaissance purposes or for delivering supplies, and so on.

In addition, specific procedures have been agreed for the prevention of misunderstandings through direct top-level contacts. Measures have also been agreed to prevent the capture of civilians. Furthermore, individuals detained without identification papers must be handed over to the nearest police station or military unit of their country of origin within 24 hours.

Ecuador and Peru, on reporting to this major Regional Conference the various confidence-building measures that they are implementing in pursuance of the Itamaraty Declaration of Peace with the valuable assistance of the Guarantor Countries of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942, reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States and to the strengthening of peace in our hemisphere.

Marcelo FERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOBA
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Ecuador

Jorge VOTO-BERNALES
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Peru

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/984
24 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by H.E. Mr. Leonid Kuchma, the President of Ukraine, dated 22 November 1995 concerning the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Permanent Representative of Ukraine
to the United Nations

95-37153 (E) 241195 241195 251195

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the President of Ukraine

Ukraine welcomed with great satisfaction the news of the initialling on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, in the United States of America, of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia.

This event was the culmination of four years of intense diplomatic efforts by the United Nations, other influential international organizations and individual countries, including Ukraine, to find a formula for reconciliation that would be acceptable to all the parties to the conflict.

In congratulating those who participated in the negotiations, I should also give credit to the members of the Contact Group for promoting the achievement of positive agreements. I should like to note the special role of the United States of America in this process.

I urge the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia to do everything in their power to implement all the provisions of the General Framework Agreement, which establishes a reliable basis for ultimately settling the conflict and establishing a comprehensive and durable peace in the Balkans. This goal can only be achieved if intensive negotiations continue and the desire for peace is reinforced by the concrete actions of all those involved.

Ukraine declares its readiness to participate directly in the practical fulfilment of the Peace Agreement, and to revitalize and reconstruct the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the wake of the conflict.

The initialling of the Agreement opens the way for the termination of the economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is an integral part of the Agreements concluded at Dayton. I hope that the United Nations Security Council will urgently consider and adopt a set of relevant resolutions on this question.

Ukraine is of the view that the complete termination of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the full entry of the latter into the international community will represent an important guarantee of peace and stability in the region and a reinforcement of security in Europe.

Kiev, 22 November 1995

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/985
24 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine dated 23 November 1995 concerning the decision of the United Nations Security Council to suspend sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Ukraine welcomes the decision by the United Nations Security Council to suspend economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which became possible following the initialling at Dayton, in the United States of America, of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia.

Ukraine, which has consistently called for the repeal of the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, believes that this event will promote progress in the subsequent negotiating process, restore trust between the parties to the conflict and serve as an impetus to the implementation of the Agreements that have been concluded.

The suspension and subsequent termination of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an event of enormous importance which will stimulate the economic development and restoration of traditional ties between all countries of the region. Ukraine is sure that peace and harmony will bring prosperity and well-being to all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.

Ukraine is of the view that the complete termination of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the full entry of the latter into the international community will represent an important guarantee of peace and stability in the region and a reinforcement of security in Europe.

Ukraine, which, like other States in the region, has suffered major losses by conscientiously adhering to the embargo, reaffirms its willingness to develop comprehensive economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the former Yugoslavia and to take part in the process of revitalizing and reconstructing the region in the wake of the conflict.

Kiev, 23 November 1995

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/986
24 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THE SITUATION CONCERNING WESTERN SAHARA

Report of the Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1017 (1995) of 22 September 1995. In paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the parties, to produce specific and detailed proposals to resolve the problems hindering the completion of the identification process in the framework of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 907 (1994) of 29 March 1994 relating to the compromise proposal of the Secretary-General (S/26185), and resolution 1002 (1995) of 30 June 1995 relating to the recommendations of the Security Council mission (S/1995/498), and to report on the outcome of his efforts in that regard by 15 November 1995.

II. CONSULTATIONS

2. The basic obstacle to continuing and completing the identification process relates to certain tribal groups and to persons not resident in the Territory, in whose identification the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) does not agree to participate and, in many instances, has no sheikh, or alternate, to propose. Identification has hitherto involved the participation of a sheikh or alternate from each side and the presence of representatives of the two parties and of an Organization of African Unity (OAU) observer. The operation has been hindered by the inability or unwillingness of any one party to make a sheikh or alternate available at a given time and place. As a result, the identification process has been slow and uneven and in the last few weeks has virtually come to a halt.

3. In my report of 8 September 1995 (S/1995/779), I stated that the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) had an obligation to consider all applications which had been correctly submitted. The essence of the identification process was, firstly, to establish the personal identity of the applicant and, secondly, to determine whether he or she qualified for inclusion in the electoral roll under one of the five eligibility criteria.

Bringing a person to be identified did not prejudge the decision. To enable MINURSO to meet its obligation in circumstances where the Frente POLISARIO was unwilling or unable to make a sheikh available, I suggested that identification should be based on documentary evidence.

4. I explained my proposal in more detail at a meeting on 10 October 1995 with Mr. Driss Slaoui, Counsellor to His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, Mr. Driss Basri, Minister of State for the Interior, General Housni Bensliman and Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi. I also instructed my Acting Special Representative, Mr. Erik Jensen, to communicate my proposal to members of the Security Council during informal consultations on 11 October, and directly to the Frente POLISARIO leadership upon his return to the region. This he did on 19 October at a meeting at Tindouf with Mr. Mahfoud Ali Beiba. On 27 October, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, I provided further elaboration of my proposal (S/1995/924).

5. In a letter dated 26 October, Mr. Ali Beiba assured my Acting Special Representative of the Frente POLISARIO's willingness to cooperate with the programme that the Secretary-General would establish to identify all persons whose applications had been received in the Territory and outside, in the camps and the Tindouf region and in Mauritania, in conformity with the settlement plan.

6. The Government of Morocco informed my Acting Special Representative of its unwillingness to accept a process that would differentiate between different groups of applicants and reiterated its insistence on oral testimony. In communications to my Acting Special Representative, dated 25 and 29 October 1995, Mr. Basri rejected a change in procedure which his Government believed was prejudicial to the inalienable rights of Western Saharans to equal treatment by the Identification Commission and to the interests of Morocco. The distinction proposed between the treatment of members of 85 subfractions and other applicants would amount to discrimination and was, in Morocco's view, contrary to the settlement plan. Morocco considered this suggested "simplification" of the procedure as a radical departure from the settlement plan and the instructions to the Identification Commission which recognized the specific nature of Saharan society and the role of oral testimony alongside various types of documentary evidence. The Minister reiterated Morocco's reservations regarding documents issued by the former Spanish administration of the Territory.

7. I propose, therefore, that the operation can be completed only with the adoption of the following procedure. In accordance with established practice and agreed principles, both parties will be invited to present a sheikh, or alternate, of the subfraction concerned and to be represented during the identification process. An OAU observer is also expected to attend. When two sheikhs, or alternates, are present, one from each side, identification will take place according to the normal proceeding. When one party does not, for whatever reason, provide a sheikh or alternate, identification will take place on the basis of appropriate documentation, with the assistance of the one sheikh present. In the case that neither party is willing or able to make available a sheikh or alternate, identification will be based on documentary evidence only.

8. The settlement plan provides for the lodging of appeals against the inclusion or exclusion of any names in the list of eligible voters established by the Identification Commission. This should serve as additional guarantee to both parties. This procedure is further detailed in the terms of reference of the Identification Commission (S/26185).

9. On 9 November, I instructed my Acting Special Representative to convey my intention orally to the two parties. On 13 November, he met with Mr. Basri in Rabat, and on 14 November with Mr. Ali Beiba near Tindouf.

10. In a communication from Mr. Basri to my Acting Special Representative dated 13 November, the Government of Morocco wished to be assured that the sheikh, when the only one present, would contribute to the identification in exactly the same manner as when there were two. It again emphasized the "privileged" place of oral testimony in the identification process. Having already rejected any attempt to limit valid documents to those issued by the Spanish authorities, it considered the reference to appropriate documentation as too vague and therefore liable to a restrictive interpretation. It further found unacceptable the proposal that identification could take place without the participation of any sheikh. In its view, this had no basis in the settlement plan and instructions to the Identification Commission, since it would exclude oral testimony entirely.

11. In a letter dated 18 November, Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, stated that the Frente POLISARIO would not subscribe to my new proposal, which it considered as a reversal of the earlier approach. It could not accept the pretext offered of a so-called departure from the framework of the settlement plan or a refusal of the other party to subscribe to the proposal in my letter to the Security Council of 27 October (S/1995/924). Mr. Abdelaziz stressed that the Frente POLISARIO had not been consulted in the formulation of the eligibility criteria and that its position had not been taken into account in the compromise concerning the interpretation and application of the criteria. In the Frente POLISARIO's view, the implementation of my new proposal would again give Morocco an added advantage and the opportunity to introduce, by means of a sheikh of its choice and of its own documents, 135,000 applicants who had no ties with Western Sahara. This would be tantamount to holding a referendum for a people other than the Western Saharans. Adoption of such an approach would prompt the Frente POLISARIO to draw the "appropriate" conclusions as to its involvement with regard to the settlement plan. Mr. Abdelaziz warned that the stability of the North African region was at stake.

III. IDENTIFICATION

12. As of 18 November 1995, all 233,487 applications have been processed (176,533 in the Territory and on the Moroccan side, 42,468 in the camps and Tindouf area, and 14,486 in Mauritania). Of those, 75,794 have been convoked (46,701 in the Territory and 29,093 in the camps), of which 58,947 have been identified (37,708 in the Territory and 21,239 in the camps), as shown in the annex to the present report. In spite of repeated convocations, the number of

applicants to come forward varies from 75 per cent of those convoked in the camps to 80 per cent in the Territory.

13. A total of 157,693 applicants remain. As has been the case, the number of persons coming forward is unlikely to exceed 80 per cent of those convoked. Experience has shown that it is technically possible for at least 3,000 persons to be identified per month at any one centre. If identification is allowed to proceed in accordance with the above procedures and without interruption, a total of 12 centres should, therefore, be able to complete identification within about four months, at a rate of 36,000 applicants per month.

14. The Government of Mauritania has confirmed its agreement to the opening of an identification centre at Atar, which is almost equidistant from Nouadhibou and Zouerate and close to the border area where many applicants reside. A technical mission has completed its work and preparatory arrangements are being made, although conditions are difficult.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

15. The identification will continue as hitherto in the case of 85 out of 88 subfractions which are listed in the census of 1974 and for which a list of sheikhs and alternates has already been established. However, the absence of a sheikh, representative or observer will not prevent identification from proceeding after the schedule for identification has been duly communicated to the parties, the convocation lists have been issued and the hours of work announced.

16. In the case of the remaining three census groups (H41, H61 and J51/52) and in those instances where identification takes place outside the Territory and the Tindouf area, identification would proceed with the participation of one side only. Both parties would be invited to provide sheikhs and representatives; it is my hope that both would be represented even in circumstances when they do not provide a sheikh. In all cases there will be no change in the procedure already established, which reflects the relevant provisions of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464) and compromise proposal (S/26185, annex I) as regards oral testimony and documentary evidence. Paragraphs 14 to 23 of the compromise proposal describe the nature of admissible documentation. It will be up to the Identification Commission to determine the validity of the oral testimony and of the documentary evidence and to decide on the merits of each applicant to be included in the electoral roll. The Identification Commission will be able to carry out its work only if both parties place their trust in its judgement and integrity.

17. Neither party is likely to be satisfied with my proposal to proceed with the identification in the manner described in paragraph 7 of the present report. Morocco wants to limit, to the extent possible, the role of documentary evidence and give privilege to that of oral testimony. The Frente POLISARIO considers that the implementation of the new approach will allow for the introduction of applicants who have no ties with Western Sahara. I have, however, concluded that the new approach is the only way the process can be carried forward. I hope that both parties will be persuaded to cooperate and give the

identification operation a chance. Should it fail to proceed with the necessary speed, it will be my intention, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1017 (1995), to present for the consideration of the Council alternative options, including the possibility of MINURSO's withdrawal.

18. In closing, I should like to thank my Acting Special Representative for his untiring efforts to move the process forward and those Member States that have assisted in the consultations with the parties.

Progress in Identification



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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 981 (1995), 982 (1995) AND 983 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995) of 30 March 1995, the Security Council decided to establish three separate, but interlinked, peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia: the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO; the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A theatre headquarters, known as United Nations Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ), was retained in Zagreb. The mandate of these missions was for a period of eight months, terminating on 30 November 1995. The present report is intended to assist the Council in its deliberations on the future of these missions.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES

2. UNPF-HQ, until recently headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who was succeeded on 1 November 1995 by Mr. Kofi Annan, exercises overall policy direction, administration and logistics for the three missions in the former Yugoslavia. A Theatre Force Commander commands the military elements of the forces under his authority. As of 17 November 1995, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Theatre Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier of France, amounted to 32,385, including 576 United Nations military observers from 36 countries. Details of troop deployments and casualties may be found in annexes I to III of the present report. There are 366 civilian police, 1,763 international civilian staff (including 1,195 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,873 local staff.

3. Each separate component of the United Nations Peace Forces is headed by a civilian chief of mission and has its own military commander. UNPROFOR is headed by Mr. Antonio Pedauye of Spain and its military commander is Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; UNCRO is headed by Mr. Byung Suk Min of the Republic of Korea and its military commander is Major-General Eid Kamal Al-Rodan of Jordan; and

UNPREDEP is headed by Mr. Henryk Sokalski of Poland and its military commander is Brigadier-General Juha Engstrom of Finland.

III. CROATIA

4. Since my report of 29 September 1995 (S/1995/835), in which I reviewed the situation following the Croatian Government's military takeover of three of the four sectors of the UNCRO, the primary tasks of UNCRO have continued to be to seek to reduce tensions in the area known as Sector East (Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium) and to monitor the conditions of minorities in the former United Nations protected areas of Sectors South, North and West, while withdrawing and repatriating all United Nations military personnel from the former sectors and closing the Sector headquarters and UNCRO military headquarters, which should be completed no later than 21 December 1995.

5. Against a background of rising military tension in Sector East, including a build-up of Croatian troops west of the Sector, and repeated statements by Croatian leaders of their intention to recapture the area if negotiations for a peaceful reintegration were unsuccessful, UNCRO supported the ongoing political negotiations by seeking to uphold the integrity of the zone of separation between the two sides and initiating local confidence-building measures, including family reunions and humanitarian visits. In view of the possibility of imminent attack, precautions were taken to reinforce and fortify UNCRO positions. Contingency plans were also made to establish sanctuary for persons who might become displaced, including assisting the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in stockpiling food, water and humanitarian supplies, which are now in place. Concern remains high for the security of United Nations troops and personnel in the Sector.

6. Following intensive local negotiations throughout September and October 1995, undertaken by my Special Envoy, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and the United States Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and further negotiations at the peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, a commitment was reached on 3 November 1995 between President Milosevic and President Tudjman to reinvigorate local negotiations. These concluded with the signing of the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium on 12 November 1995. The text of the basic agreement has been communicated to the Council in document S/1995/951. In its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November 1995, the Security Council welcomed the agreement and expressed its readiness to consider expeditiously the request to establish a transitional administration and authorize an appropriate international force.

7. Meanwhile, in accordance with resolutions 981 (1995), 994 (1995), 1009 (1995) and 1019 (1995), UNCRO personnel, in close cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), have continued to monitor the situation of vulnerable groups, including refugees from Velika Kladusa and the mainly Croatian Serb minority in the former sectors. Approximately 6,000 Croatian Serbs have remained in Sectors North and South, many of whom are elderly or disabled and living in remote areas in desperate conditions. UNCRO continued to document serious violations of their human rights, including harassment, looting

of property, burning of houses and killing of civilians. While the Croatian Government has recently made efforts to improve the conditions of Croatian Serbs in the Sectors and incidents of house-burning have decreased, the continuing pattern of violence and intimidation raises serious concerns about their welfare, including the ability of many of them to survive the winter under conditions of economic and physical deprivation. UNCRO has provided assistance to these people, but the clear responsibility for their welfare lies with the Croatian Government, which will have to demonstrate, by concrete action, its willingness to ensure respect for the rights of the Croatian Serb minority in the former sectors, and to cooperate with international organizations towards this end.

8. There has not yet been a positive response from the Croatian Government to the Council's concern, most recently expressed in resolution 1019 (1995) of 9 November 1995, about time-limits placed on refugees to return to Croatia to reclaim their property. The law on the temporary management of currently abandoned property in the formerly occupied territory is due to come into effect on 3 December 1995. It allows the Croatian Government to make abandoned homes and property available for the housing of displaced persons unless the owners of the property claim their property for personal use by returning to Croatia. At the present time, designated administrative procedures and justified concerns for security constitute virtually insurmountable obstacles to the return of Serbs to claim their property.

9. UNCRO has conducted a series of prison visits to follow the cases of some 800 Croatian Serbs detained following the Croatian military operations in the former sectors. Difficulty of access to lawyers is a persistent complaint; there is also concern about the lack of specificity of charges. UNCRO has also provided civil affairs and civilian police assistance to the UNHCR operation in Kuplensko refugee camp in former Sector North. The camp houses more than 20,000 Bosniac refugees (Abdic loyalists) from Velika Kladusa.

10. The situation around the Prevlaka peninsula has remained stable, although there have been provocations on both sides. The presence of United Nations military observers in both the Prevlaka and Dubrovnik areas has contributed to controlling tensions in these potentially explosive regions.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

11. During the current mandate period, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been dominated by three main elements. First, there has been an unprecedented level of military activity in the theatre, including offensives by all sides, which have resulted in major movements of refugees and displaced persons and in widespread violations of international humanitarian law by Bosnian Serb forces. Secondly, there has been a change in the roles of UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both of which became militarily engaged against the Bosnian Serbs. Thirdly, the United States-led peace initiative, together with a significant and country-wide decrease in fighting, have, in recent weeks, provided the first real opportunity in many months for a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12. In the first part of the current mandate period, UNPROFOR faced major difficulties in implementing its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina owing to the apparent determination of the parties to achieve a military solution to the conflict following the expiration of the December 1994 cessation-of-hostilities agreement (see S/1995/8, annexes I and II). The Bosnian Serb non-compliance with the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone and weapon collection points in May 1995 and the use of NATO air strikes against a Bosnian Serb ammunition depot in Pale as a riposte to the failure of the Serbs to return heavy weapons to storage sites resulted in the Bosnian Serb forces taking over 300 UNPROFOR personnel as hostages, some of whom were used as "human shields" in strategically important locations. In response to the hostage crisis and to the untenable situation of UNPROFOR, the Security Council, by its resolution 998 (1995), approved the deployment of a rapid reaction capacity in order to provide UNPF/UNPROFOR with an enhanced capability to carry out its mandate.

13. As described in detail in my report to the Council of 30 August 1995 (S/1995/755), the Bosnian Serbs launched a full-scale assault on 6 July 1995 against the safe area of Srebrenica, as a result of which a large number of human rights abuses were inflicted on the population. Following this assault, the Serbs began an attack on the nearby safe area of Zepa, which fell to their forces on 25 July. On 21 July, as the Serbs were attacking Zepa, the foreign ministers of the Contact Group, NATO and UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations met in London to discuss future action in the light of the inability of UNPROFOR to deter attacks on Srebrenica. Following this, the parties to the conflict, in particular the Bosnian Serbs, were warned that further violations of the safe areas would be met with decisive force, including the use of NATO air strikes.

14. On 28 August 1995, 5 mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of Sarajevo's Markale market place, 1 of which killed 37 people and wounded 88 others. In order to restore the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo and to deter any further attacks on safe areas, multiple NATO air strikes were conducted with the approval of the UNPF Force Commander against Serb anti-aircraft systems and heavy weapons in the vicinity of Sarajevo, as well as against ammunition supply depots and other military facilities throughout eastern Bosnian Serb territory. During this operation, mortars and artillery of the rapid reaction force engaged Bosnian Serb targets in the area of Sarajevo.

15. Soon after NATO began air operations in eastern Bosnia, Bosnian government and Croatian forces began to advance in the western part of the country. In the week of 10 September 1995, Bosnian government forces took much of the Ozren salient, while, simultaneously, Croatian forces made sweeping advances in the south-west of the country, including the capture of areas traditionally populated by Bosnian Serbs. Major flows of displaced persons began. At the same time as fighting was raging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States continued actively to pursue the peace initiative it had begun during the summer. On 5 October 1995, the United States delegation secured a country-wide cease-fire agreement that included non-military elements such as humane treatment for detained persons, freedom of movement and the right of displaced persons to return to their original homes. UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel immediately undertook various measures to ensure the successful implementation of the cease-fire agreement, including demining activities that were necessary for the repair and reopening of utilities for Sarajevo. The

Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR conducted the negotiations that led to the entry into force of the cease-fire.

16. Since 12 October 1995, when the cease-fire agreement entered into force, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved significantly. Passage in the city on "blue routes" has been unrestricted since the cease-fire, and UNPROFOR has been escorting civilian convoys in the area of Sarajevo in order to guarantee freedom of movement. Implementation of the action plan of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo accelerated dramatically with the improvement in the security situation. For most of the period between April and September 1995, restrictions on access of goods into the city delayed project implementation. However, with the opening of the route over Mount Igman, spare parts and equipment have been able to reach the city in considerable quantities for the first time since the Office was established. The United Nations Trust Fund has committed funds totalling more than $11 million to vital projects in the city, many of which are now coming to fruition. In addition, the Office has been actively involved in the restoration and stabilization of the utilities network and played a leading role in the negotiations on utilities that preceded implementation of the cease-fire on 12 October 1995. On 30 October, the first convoys of civilian trucks and buses were escorted between Sarajevo and Gorazde. Escorted convoys enjoy freedom of movement on main routes, but Bosnian government forces have recently prevented United Nations escorts provided by the Russian contingent from entering Gorazde.

17. Compliance with the current cease-fire has been noticeably better than with previous cease-fires. Neither side has engaged in offensive activity, and all parties are participating constructively in joint military commissions. United Nations military observers now operate in Bosnian Serb-held areas and UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys, as well as escorted civilian vehicles, move freely in and out of Sarajevo and Gorazde. Sarajevo airport operates safely and without hindrance, and releases of prisoners of war and detainees have taken place. However, none of the sides has yet complied fully with the provisions of the cease-fire agreement with respect to freedom of movement for UNPROFOR patrols. For example, restrictions are still being imposed by Bosnian Croat military units in north-western Bosnia.

18. Investigations of recent expulsions from northern Bosnia have revealed significant human rights abuses, while denial of access to Srebrenica continues to impede efforts to determine the full extent of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights that followed the fall of the enclave. Minority residents of Banja Luka continue to face escalating threats to their security and the possibility of imminent expulsion. Of particular concern are reports that hundreds of men of military age were separated from the persons forcibly displaced from Banja Luka and other Bosnian Serb-controlled towns, both at the collection points where people were forced to assemble for the convoys and at stops along the way to Bosnian Government-held territory. The fate of these men and of many hundreds of others who had been conscripted for forced labour before the expulsions occurred remains unknown. Concerns have also been raised over the welfare of Bosnian and Croatian Serb refugees and displaced persons and over the Bosnian and Croatian Governments' practice of resettling refugees and displaced persons, occasionally against their will, in areas recently brought under their control.

19. The limited progress in the political, social and economic integration of the Bosniac-Croat Federation has resulted in difficulties for United Nations activities. Continuation of the Federation, which serves as a foundation of the peace process, is threatened by the failure of both the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniacs to agree on certain fundamental issues and to implement what they have agreed. The most important include transfers of responsibility to the Federation, accommodation in areas recently recovered from the Bosnian Serbs in western Bosnia and the resettlement of displaced persons. While an accord on these issues was recently announced, this has yet to be translated into meaningful cooperation on the ground. The difficult relationship between the Government of the Federation and that of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has also caused some operational problems for the United Nations, notably in connection with the deployment of the rapid reaction capacity of UNPROFOR.

V. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

20. The attempt on the life of President Kiro Gligorov of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been the most significant single event during the mandate period. This terrorist act, which was unanimously condemned by all major political forces in the country, has fortunately neither destabilized national life nor slowed down the processes of internal reforms and foreign policy initiatives.

21. The country's growing role in the international arena has contributed considerably to maintaining internal peace and security. Although opposition parties continue to challenge the outcome of last year's parliamentary elections, the ruling coalition's majority in the legislature has made it possible to pass several important laws in the areas of democratization, privatization, formation of political parties, local self-government and education. However, internal differences remain, and internal threats to the country's stability have not ceased. Dissatisfaction continues to be strongest among the ethnic Albanian minority. The Government, on the other hand, believes that inter-ethnic relations unnecessarily "internationalize" domestic issues and that this can work against the interests of the country. In the past eight months, however, the Government has taken steps to meet some of the concerns of the ethnic Albanian community. All persons serving prison terms related to the arms affair and the disturbances at Tetovo last February have been released. A special four-year course for teachers in the Albanian language has been offered at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje. A 10-per cent quota has been reserved at institutions of higher learning for students representing ethnic minorities, and the first ethnic Albanian general in the army has been appointed. The new laws on education and local government now contain a number of provisions relating to the needs and rights of ethnic minorities. Significantly, ethnic Albanian members of Parliament have ceased boycotting parliamentary sessions and have resumed active participation in the work of the National Assembly.

22. Externally, there is little evidence to indicate any imminent military threat to the country's territorial integrity. Three of the four neighbouring countries have given their official recognition to the State of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) remains pending.

23. The interim accord between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (S/1995/794, annex), signed on 13 September 1995, has been a milestone in relations between the two countries, and will have far-reaching implications for the region as a whole. I wish to express my warm appreciation to the two Governments for their constructive approaches, which helped me and my Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, to respond effectively to the Council's request contained in resolution 845 (1993). I am continuing the efforts to find solutions to the remaining differences between the two countries. The accord, which strengthened the Republic's international standing, was immediately followed by the establishment of full diplomatic relations with several other States, the country's admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, participation in the "Partnership for Peace" initiative and a number of other international and regional arrangements.

24. Economically, the country has for too long been exposed to the double effects of the embargo from the south and the consequences of international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). One consequence has been frequent sanctions violations. However, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and a number of friendly countries, the Government has been taking various measures to stabilize the economy. Their success has been only partial. Whereas the inflation rate has been reduced and the pace of privatization and banking reforms has continued, industrial production has considerably declined and unemployment has increased to 50 per cent of the workforce.

25. The effective role of UNPREDEP has been of major importance to the highest authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. UNPREDEP's regular maintenance of working contacts with a number of government ministries has allowed for the development of exemplary cooperation and partnerships at different levels of Government. Contacts with all political forces in the country, including the opposition and those representing ethnic minorities, have been of special value to the functioning of the mission and the implementation of its mandate. Mutually beneficial contacts have also been initiated by the UNPREDEP Commander with the military authorities of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). There is consent on both sides that more tolerance should be displayed during border encounters and that potentially explosive but minor border crossings will be considered as "honest mistakes". Consequently, the number of border incidents between patrols of the two sides has significantly decreased.

VI. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

26. Throughout the duration of the mission, the United Nations peace-keeping force has maintained a presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to conduct political liaison and public information functions, along with the tasks relevant to monitoring of the Prevlaka peninsula, as mandated by resolution 779 (1992), and of airfields, as mandated by paragraph 5 of resolution 786 (1992). The level of cooperation with the federal authorities that the Belgrade Liaison Office enjoys has proved to be a vital element in the effective functioning of the three missions, and it remains necessary to maintain a United Nations presence there. In this regard, it is

important that the Federal Government should extend to the United Nations, its personnel, property, funds and assets the necessary privileges and immunities deriving from Article 105 (1) of the Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

27. The general framework agreement, which was initialled by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia on 21 November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, at last provides the basis for peace to become reality in the war-torn lands of the former Yugoslavia. I have already publicly expressed my welcome and support for the agreement and I should like to commend all those whose efforts were instrumental in bringing the agreement about. That this agreement has been reached only after the loss of perhaps quarter of a million lives, most of them innocent civilians, is a cause for deep mourning by the international community, especially since the killings were often the result of appalling atrocities. For peace to be durable, there should also be justice.

28. The framework agreement, which was informally made available to the Security Council on 21 November 1995, is comprehensive and detailed and contains many aspects with far-reaching implications not only for the United Nations peace-keeping forces currently deployed in the former Yugoslavia, but also for the future role of the Organization in that region. These implications have yet to be fully assessed and analysed, but I stand ready to assist and support the Security Council in the decisions and actions that need to be taken with regard to the implementation of the general framework agreement and its relevant annexes. Some of the following recommendations concerning the mandates of UNCRO, UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP and UNPF-HQ already reflect, on a preliminary basis, certain provisions of the agreement reached in Dayton. However, I intend to submit further reports shortly regarding the tasks for the United Nations and its specialized agencies that may be required in the implementation of the agreement of 21 November 1995.

A. UNCRO

29. The basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium, signed on 12 November 1995, is a landmark accomplishment that provides for the peaceful integration into Croatia of the region known as Sector East. It also opens the way for the return to their homes of all Croatian displaced persons who so wish.

30. The basic agreement requests the Security Council to establish a transitional administration to govern the region during the transitional period of 12 months, which may be extended by up to a further 12 months and to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security during the transitional period and to otherwise assist in the implementation of the agreement. The region will also be demilitarized not later than 30 days after its deployment. During the transitional period, civilian tasks include ensuring that refugees and displaced persons can return, supervising property matters,

monitoring human rights, re-establishing the normal functioning of all public services, coordinating international support and assistance and organizing and monitoring the conduct of elections. In addition, the basic agreement envisages the establishment and training of temporary local police forces and the presence of international monitors along the international border of the region to facilitate free movement of persons across existing border crossings.

31. It has yet to be determined which States, international organizations or institutions are to perform these and other complex tasks but, in the light of the recent history of broken agreements followed by rapid escalation of violence, it is clear that, should the basic agreement not be fully and properly implemented, war would probably be resumed, with potentially grave consequences for the prospects for peace not only in Croatia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Timeliness of implementation is also of the essence for the present momentum of peace to be sustained. For these reasons it merits full international support for its effective and timely implementation. The alternative is a return to the cycle of political stalemate and escalating violence leading to renewed war and tens of thousands more refugees. As already noted, the Security Council, in its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November, has acknowledged the need for expeditious follow-up action on the request made to it in the agreement to establish a transitional administration and to authorize an international force.

32. There would appear to be only two realistic options for the future of UNCRO: either the Security Council could decide to terminate its functions when its current mandate expires on 30 November 1995 in the expectation that interested States, international organizations and other institutions would assume responsibility for implementing the basic agreement from that date, or the Council could decide to continue the presence of UNCRO for a limited period, during which UNCRO would, to the extent possible, perform its present tasks until the transitional administration is established and an international force is deployed to carry out the tasks envisaged in the basic agreement.

33. In keeping with Security Council resolution 1023 (1995), my Special Representative is maintaining close contact with all parties concerned. In recent meetings with my Special Representative, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, stated clearly that he could not agree to a further extension of the mandate of UNCRO. However, he would agree to retain the two currently deployed battalions as a transitional arrangement. He has insisted that the implementation of the basic agreement, particularly its demilitarization aspects, begin on 1 December. However, to terminate the UNCRO mandate on 30 November 1995 without the certainty that other institutions are able to assume the responsibility for the implementation of the basic agreement could severely destabilize the area. In the light of the position taken by President Tudjman, the Council may wish to maintain the presence of UNCRO for a transitional period of two months or until it has decided on the deployment of the international force, whichever is the sooner. During this period, UNCRO could facilitate and provide appropriate assistance to the deployment of the international force and the establishment of the transitional administration, but would not be in a position, as presently mandated and constituted, to facilitate the demilitarization envisaged in the basic agreement. At this point, there is no concurrence on the part of the Croatian Government to UNCRO's

continuation of its present functions in Croatia, except perhaps for the monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula as a confidence-building measure. In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to confirm the UNCRO's presence as a transitional arrangement pending the establishment of an international force; designate, as quickly as possible, a civilian transitional administrator for the region; and determine the date on which implementation of the basic agreement should begin.

B. United Nations Protection Force

34. The general framework agreement initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995, promises to mark a turning-point in the endeavour to re-establish stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since it envisages the implementation of the military and regional stabilization aspects to be the responsibility of a new Implementation Force (IFOR), to be authorized by the Security Council, a primary task for UNPROFOR is to arrange for the transfer of responsibility to IFOR. Planning for this transfer has been under way in close consultation with NATO, on which I shall report to the Council as soon as possible.

35. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR's recently improved ability to carry out its mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been due primarily to the revitalization of the peace process. This process, which has now culminated in the initialling of the framework agreement, coupled with Bosnian Serb military reverses, has brought about enhanced compliance by the parties with the cease-fire of 12 October. The assumption by President Milosevic of the authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Republika Srpska has been an important factor in this context. Another critical element is the increased deterrence achieved as a result of the manner in which NATO air power and the rapid reaction force were employed in August and September, following redeployments that greatly reduced UNPROFOR's vulnerability throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

36. In the light of the improving situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the critical financial situation of the United Nations, I have accepted the recommendations of my Special Representative and the Force Commander that only essential forces should be retained to implement UNPROFOR's mandate pending a transition to other arrangements. In this context, two battalions and four sub-units are being repatriated, six other battalions are being reduced to a standard strength of about 965 all ranks and portions of the rapid reaction force placed on standby in their home countries. As a result, UNPROFOR will decline in strength from about 30,500 to about 21,600 by mid-December 1995. Some further reductions, with an associated streamlining of command and control and administrative support, are also possible, given the greatly reduced need for UNPROFOR to escort humanitarian convoys in the more secure environment currently prevailing. These reductions do not pre-empt any decision by the Security Council on the military aspect of the implementation of the framework agreement. It should be noted that some countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR have expressed interest in joining IFOR, which would implement the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be my intention to withdraw as soon as practicable those contingents not joining the multinational force.

37. Pending finalization of the arrangements for transfer of responsibility to IFOR, I recommend that the current mandate of UNPROFOR be extended for two months, or until an appropriate transfer of authority has been executed between UNPROFOR and the incoming Implementation Force, subject to authorization by the Security Council, whichever is sooner. To this end, UNPF-HQ has held exploratory discussions with NATO about action to be taken if it should be decided to replace UNPROFOR with a NATO-led multinational force. These discussions have taken place at all levels on issues that will be relevant to the smooth transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to a multinational force, taking into account the political and financial responsibilities of both organizations. I am currently analysing the implications for the United Nations, should the Security Council decide to authorize the continuation of civilian tasks, such as humanitarian and civilian police activities, which are contained in the framework agreement. It is anticipated that, prior to any such transfer of authority, increased demands will be placed on UNPF to allow Sarajevo Airport to be used for categories of air traffic other than those specified in the agreement of 5 June 1992 (S/24075, annex) as endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 761 (1992) of 29 June 1992. Considering that expanded use of the airport is critically needed at this time, I am authorizing my Special Representative to permit, on a case-by-case basis, expanded use of the airport, taking due account of the nature of the flights, the physical and technical limitations of the airport and the potential liabilities for the Organization. I trust that this will meet with the Council's concurrence.

C. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

38. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPREDEP's preventive deployment role has contributed greatly to the peace and stability of the southern Balkans. The operation has proved that preventive deployment is an effective form of peace-keeping and that results can be achieved even with a small, almost symbolic deployment of United Nations peace-keepers, if it is done at the right time and with a clear mandate. The host country does not expect the United Nations to defend its borders and considers the very presence of an international force a deterrent sufficient to discourage potential aggressors. So far, the fundamental objective of the operation, that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia be prevented from spreading, has been achieved. However, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is of the opinion, which I share, that the causes that led to the establishment of the United Nations preventive deployment operation have not ceased to exist. The continued presence of UNPREDEP, with basically the same mandate, strength and troop composition, is vital to the maintenance of peace and stability in the country. I also remain conscious of the need to revert to the Council, as soon as practicable, on the establishment of UNPREDEP on a fully independent footing, reporting directly to New York. This will require adjustments to the administrative, logistic and military support structures of the mission and thus minor adjustments to its authorized strength. It is my intention to make appropriate recommendations to the Council on these issues as soon as possible. In any event, the mandate of UNPREDEP should be renewed for a further 12-month period irrespective of developments elsewhere in the theatre.

D. United Nations Peace Forces headquarters

39. In the light of the actions that will have to be decided in order to implement the general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the transfer of responsibility from UNPROFOR to a multinational force, and the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, I am not in a position, at this stage, to recommend definitive changes in the structure of the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia, or for the future of the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters in Zagreb. As already indicated, I shall revert to the Council with appropriate recommendations once the situation is sufficiently clear.

40. In conclusion, I should like to pay tribute to my former Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, my Special Envoy, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Force Commander, General Bernard Janvier, the chiefs of mission and the military commanders of UNCRO, UNPREDEP and UNPROFOR, and the courageous and dedicated men and women of the three UNPF missions for their devoted efforts in the service of the United Nations, and of peace, in the former Yugoslavia.

41. Further, I should like to commend all those Governments, institutions, organizations and their respective representatives and other personnel whose patient and tireless efforts over the past five years have made an invaluable contribution to preparing the ground for the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium signed on 12 November 1995, and the general framework agreement that was initialled in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995. This long list includes prominently the members of the Security Council, the Contact Group and the former and current Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.

42. Finally, I pay tribute to those men and women of the United Nations peace-keeping operations and humanitarian organizations who lost their lives in their mission to alleviate the suffering of the peoples in the former Yugoslavia and to restore peace in that region.

Annex I

Deployment of units, military observers and civilian police as of 17 November 1995

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
1. CROATIA (UNCRO)					
(a) Headquarters, Zagreb		271	39	26	
(b) Gar Comd - Zagreb		7		19	
(c) Gar Comd - Split		10		4	
(d) Gar Comd - Ploce		6			
(i) Infantry battalions					
Sector East	Belgium	693			
	Russian Federation	912			
		1 605	48	16	
Former Sector North					
	Denmark	119			
	Poland	461			
	Jordan (2)	6			
	Ukraine (2)	5			
		591	31	61	
Former Sector South					
	Canada (1)	9			
	Czech Republic	523			
	Jordan (3)	6			
	Kenya	2			
		540	34	71	
Former Sector West	Nepal	165			
		165	12	99	
Subtotal		3 195	164	296	

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
(ii) Support units					
Canadian support unit		450			
Danish logistic contingent		11			
French logistics battalion		828			
Finland HQ Finguard		39			
Indonesian medical battalion		236			
Netherlands logistic base		78			
Norwegian movement control unit		114			
Slovak engineer battalion		590			
Swedish headquarters company		100			
United States field hospital		361			
Ukrainian helicopter unit		60			
German hospital		519			
Subtotal		3 386			7 041
2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNPROFOR)					
(a) UNPROFOR headquarters		171	14	13	
(b) Infantry units					
Sector Sarajevo	Headquarters	78			
	Egypt	413			
	France (2) (incl HQ pers)	854			
	France (4)	850			
	France (5)	892			
	Ukraine (1)	566			
	Russian Federation (2)	498			
		4 151	79	8	
(c) Support units Sector Sarajevo					
	French Headquarters company	215			
	French air operations group	241			
	French medical detachment	27			
		483			

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
(d) Infantry Battalion Groups					
Sector North East	Headquarters	44			
	Nordic (2)	1 122			
	Jordanian radar unit	102			
	Pakistan (1)	1 309			
	Pakistan (2)	1 313			
	Pakistan (NS HQ + HQ)	370			
		4 260	68		
Sector South West	Headquarters	106			
	United Kingdom (2)	433			
	New Zealand company	250			
	Canada (2)	189			
	Malaysia	971			
	Spain	1 237			
	Turkey	1 450			
		4 636	71	2	
Bihac	Headquarters	11			
	Bangladesh	334			
		345	45	22	
Banja Luka			34		
Subtotal		14 046	311	45	
(e) Support units					
Belgian transport battalion		95			
United Kingdom SP Elms		1 204			
Danish headquarters company		158			
French support unit (DETALAT)		301			
French engineer battalion		558			
Norwegian air unit		41			
Norwegian logistic battalion		688			
Indonesian engineer battalion		469			

		Units	United Nations military observers	Civilian police	Total
	Netherlands transport battalion	555			
	Tuzla air base	17			
		4 086			
	Subtotal	4 086			
(f)	Rapid reaction force	6 046			24 534
3.	FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA (UNPREDEP)				
(a)	Infantry units				
	Nordic Battalion 1	556			
	United States units	494			
	Subtotal	1 050	24	25	1 099
4.	OTHER LOCATIONS				
(a)	Airfield monitors		47		
(b)	Prevlaka		30		
	Subtotal		77		77
	Total	31 809	576	366	32 751

Annex II

Casualty list as of 17 November 1995
(Military personnel)

	Croatia							
	Sector East	Former Sector West	Former Sector North	Former Sector South	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Other areas	Total
War casualties								
Fatal	3	3	12	11	51	0	0	80
Total	36	24	71	93	477	0	7	708
Other casualties								
Fatal	3	9	9	5	28	0	12	66
Total	43	42	32	30	215	12	80	454
Traffic casualties								
Fatal	3	3	4	9	36	1	10	66
Total	41	56	52	59	239	11	51	509
Total								
Fatal	9	15	25	25	115	1	22	212
Total	120	122	155	182	931	23	138	1 671

Annex III

Strength by country as of 17 November 1995

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Argentina	0	5	0
Bangladesh	340	42	25
Belgium	794	15	0
Brazil	0	32	3
Canada	661	14	0
Czech Republic	523	17	0
Denmark	399	15	26
Egypt	427	16	33
Estonia	33	0	0
Finland	464	15	8
France	7 555	10	25
Germany	519	0	0
Ghana	0	30	0
Indonesia	707	5	0
Ireland	0	9	17
Jordan	114	45	30
Kenya	2	47	14
Lithuania	32	0	0
Malaysia	1 004	0	0
Nepal	165	6	0
Netherlands	861	32	10
New Zealand	250	9	0
Nigeria	0	26	26
Norway	921	28	13
Pakistan	3 023	22	0
Poland	461	19	15
Portugal	0	12	30

Country	Troops	Military observers	Civilian police
Russian Federation	1 417	32	20
Senegal	0	0	20
Slovakia	590	0	0
Spain	1 259	19	0
Sweden	1 152	19	25
Switzerland	0	6	6
Tunisia	0	0	0
Turkey	1 466	0	0
Ukraine	646	10	20
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4 867	19	0
United States of America	858	0	0
Venezuela	0	0	0
Others a/	294		
Total	31 809	576	366

a/ UNPF HQ, GAR COMD - Zagreb, Split and Ploce (includes personnel from countries above).

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